Findings for determinants of mode choice are somewhat slim. Chen (2006) found that firms are more likely to choose greenfield investment when they have a lot of firm-specific assets (such as knowledge) that may be difficult to transfer to an operation already running.
Attacking the question at a different angle, Shapiro et al (2007) studied whether location determinants differ by entry mode. Location choice for equity joint ventures were affected significantly by wage, FDI stock, education, and presence of special economic zones, while cooperative joint ventures only saw significance from the economic zones, and wholly owned enterprises saw significance only in FDI stock.
On that note, papers studying locational determinants ofFDI to China are quite common, and give myriad findings on important variables: proximity to markets and suppliers (Amiti and Javorcki, 2005) , governance quality and corruption (Cole et al, 2009 ), labor quality, economic zones, and distance (Gao, 2005) , patent certification volume, share of state-owned business, GDP, wage, and road density (Kawai, 2009 ). Again, not every study agrees on which variables are significant, but when they do, the signs are usually the same.
Research on investment timing, at least in China, is even slimmer than that for mode choice. However, one paper by Raff and Ryan (2008) finds various firm characteristics that affect investment timing -size, productivity, and R&D intensity were found to be correlated with a greater eagerness to invest more quickly, while a lack of diversity in a firms product line is associated with a more conservative approach.
Institutional determinants of FDI
Institutional characteristics ofFDI's host countries is a popular line of inquiry, inquiry which has confirmed intuitive notions of how "better" institutions should affect FDI. In a more general example, Aizenman and Spiegel (2002) analyze an expert survey-based measure of "institutional efficiency" in its effect on investment composition, and find that the ratio ofFDI to domestic investment rises with greater efficiency. Similarly, Benassy-Quere et al (2007) find that "quality of bureaucracy," is an important factor in FDI inflow.
More specific research includes the finding by Fung et al (2005) that market reforms, as proxied by proportion of state-owned enterprises in the various Chinese provinces, is a more important determinant, at least in China, ofFDI inflow. Hong's 2008 paper finds that accession into the World Trade Organization fundamentally changed the way FDI inflows to China were determined -from high reliance on GDP, university count, and road density, to wage level and agglomeration.
One interesting paper by Havrylchyk and Poncet (2007) posits that distortions caused by Chinese policies, in particular state restrictions on credit access and proportion of state-owned banking, can increase FDI inflow, as such institutions can hamper domestic competition more severely than foreign competition. The data studied seem to support this position.
Corruption as a determinant
There is almost unanimous agreement in the literature that in the broadest sense, corruption is a deterrent to foreign investment. Egger and Winner (2006) proposed two opposing forces of corruption, referred to as "grabbing hand" and "helping hand," which deter and encourage investment, respectively. Their finding was that the "grabbing hand" overpowered the "helping hand" and realized an overall deterrence. This general result is agreed upon in all literature (e.g. Globerman and Shapiro, 2003) that employs corruption as an independent variable, in addition to the other dimensions of effect corruption has been found to have.
For instance, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) finds that not only is corruption in general important, but also the differential in the corruption level between investor country and host country. Interestingly, it turns out that countries which themselves have high levels of corruption send relatively more FDI to high-corruption hosts. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) agree with this result.
In a finer examination specifically on corruption in China, Cole et al (2009) proxy for anti-corruption efforts in the various provinces of China using number of corruption investigations per capita. This paper holds the distinction ofbeing one of the only attempts to study the effect of corruption in China on FDI on the provincial level, and unsurprisingly finds a positive correlation between anti-corruption efforts and FDI levels. While corruption investigations may be an unsatisfactory proxy for corruption level, it could easily be argued that it is the perception of corruption that affects a firm's willingness to invest, and corruption investigations may have a significant effect on those perceptions. Straub (2008) attempts to find the difference in effect on FDI between bureaucratic and political corruption, vis-a-vis their impact on investment through FDI vs. "arm's length" investment (that is, investment with looser control rights endowed to the investor, like license agreements). The author finds that bureaucratic corruption favors non-FDI investment, but at a magnitude that falls off as the level of corruption increases. Meanwhile, political corruption also favors non-FDI investment, but only very weakly unless interacted with a political risk measure.
Globerman and Shapiro's 2003 paper on how governance and infrastructure affect FDI perhaps most closely sets precedent for the subject of this paper. It is broader, in that it addresses not just corruption, but economic openness, government effectiveness, contract enforcement, and even origin of legal system in FDI host country. It is also based on a panel of several countries instead of just China. In another sense it is narrower, as it compares determinants between industry, but restricts itself to comparing high-tech industry to all other industry, finding that high-tech industries are more positively affected by work force education level. The study uses a two stage model; a probit for likelihood of receiving FDI, followed by a regression estimating determinants on amount ofFDI received. The general finding is that there is a certain threshold of governance quality below which a host country is unlikely to receive any FDI at all, whereas countries which have received FDI are more likely to see a greater volume accompanying greater economic openness and government effectiveness, and lower corruption.
III. Empirical Framework
This section will describe two empirical models. The first model is a standard ordinary least squares regression to find the correlation between national-level corruption in China and the timing of investments in the various Chinese provinces by US firms. Specifically the dependent variable will be the log of days passed between 1980, when China was first open to foreign investment, and the first investment made in China by the firm represented by a given observation. The independent variables are, first, a measure of corruption, and then a battery of provincial variables, firm-level variables, and other control variables.
The second is a probit model intended to measure the correlation between the same measures of corruption and the likelihood of a firm, which has already decided to invest in China, to invest in one of four so-called "high-equity" modes of investment, versus one "lowequity" type of investment. The high equity modes are as follows: new plants, acquisitions, joint ventures, and wholly-owned subsidiaries. Regional sales offices are regarded as low-equity investments. Agreements for sales contracts and licensing agreements are also considered lowequity investment, but are not present in the sample.
Timing of Investment
The variable used to measure timing of investment is the log of days passed between January 1, 1980 and the date ofthe observed investment. The following graph demonstrates the general shape of investment timing: While it must be agreed that corruption, however defined, must have some effect on economic behavior, deciding to use it as a statistical variable begs the question: how do we measure it? It seems to me that there are two options facing the researcher. One is to use a proxy variable, as Cole et al did in their 2009 paper. Their particular method of using number of corruption cases per capita by province is appealing, but presents problems both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, there is the problem of whether to consider a high number of cases a sign of rampant corruption or of a low tolerance of corruption (the paper in question treats it as the latter).
As an analogy, consider how potential homebuyers might react to a high level of theft convictions in a particular neighborhood. Perhaps a savvy homebuyer would anticipate increased property values due to thieves being deterred by the crackdown, but it seems unreasonable to say confidently that buyers at large would have this reaction.
The other option available is a corruption index. There are at least three such indices available, all three of which were utilized during this experiment. The three are as follows: The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators Project (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , which includes an index measuring "control of corruption," Transparency International's corruption perceptions index , and Political Risk Services Group's quality of government index , which incorporates a corruption measure.
It is important to note that all three of these indices are based on surveys given to various experts in economics, politics, and industry, and are thus based on subjective perceptions of corruption rather than direct, tangible measurements. However, if they do accurately measure perceptions of corruption, then they can still be considered useful, as it could be argued that perceptions of corruption are what drive the behavior of firms considering investing, rather than the corruption level itself.
Corruption: 1980-2004
It appears at first glance that the three indices exhibit significantly different trends. PRSG essentially has no trend, while World Bank has a gentle downward trend, and Transparency International has a slow downward trend until the mid-90s, when it experiences a sharp dropoff, followed by somewhat chaotic swings through to the 2000s.
Below is a correlation As can be seen, noting that all three indices assign a higher score to "better" corruption levels, the three indices that purport to measure roughly the same thing have poor to strikingly bad (i.e. incorrectly signed) correlation. At best this means that only one of them is worth considering, and at worst it means that all three are essentially worthless, at least without more observations. During the course of the experiment, it became apparent that both the World Bank's and Political Risk Services Group's indices suffered severe multicollinearity in the equity type probit, so were dropped in favor ofTransparency International's Index. In the timing of entry regression, results for all three indices will be presented. For timing of investment, I formulated the variable as a dummy indicating that the investment took place within one year of the establishment of an SEZ in the given province. The sign on this variable may go either way theoretically, but it seems reasonable to say that a firm which invests only when the institutional business climate improves is one that invests more cautiously, and thus will wait longer in general to invest. Therefore the predicted sign on this variable is positive.
NationaVProvince Level Control Variables
For type of investment, I formulated the variable as a dummy simply indicating that at least one SEZ was present in the province at the time of investment. I predict that SEZ presence will encourage firms to make more high-equity investments, so I predict the variable's sign to be positive.
Education: This is a standard control variable to proxy for human capital, and is widely found to have a positive relationship with FDI inflows in general, particularly in Gao's 2005
paper. I predict that education, here formulated as enrollment levels in secondary schools, will have a negative relationship with timing and a positive relationship with high equity investment.
Highway Density: This is also a standard control variable, which can proxy for both infrastructure and ease of commerce. Almost all papers investigating FDI include highway density or something like it (e.g. rail density) as a control. I predict that highway density will have a negative correlation with timing, and a positive correlation with high equity investment.
Note that this variable is de-trended for use in the timing model.
Rural Electricity: This variable, which measures consumption of electricity in rural areas
of the provinces, is used as a proxy for infrastructure. This variable has not been used in any previous literature on FDI in China that I am aware of. I predict that this too will have a negative correlation with timing and a positive correlation with high equity investment.
GDP per Capita: GDP or GDP per capita is a standard control variable used in virtually
every single empirical analysis ofFDI patterns. It is theoretically linked to greater FDI inflows and empirically this has been borne out. Likewise I predict that GDP per capita will be negatively correlated with timing, and positively correlated with high equity investment. Note that the variable is de-trended for use in the timing model.
Wages: This too is a boilerplate control variable, with higher wages almost always corresponding to deterred investment. That being the case, I predict wages to be positively correlated to timing of investment. Correlation with equity type is a little more difficult to discern. It may be the case that higher wages (and thus greater disposable income) could attract more sales offices, while high-equity export oriented firms may be drawn to low wage areas. I will provisionally predict that wages will be negatively correlated to high equity investment.
Note that the variable is de-trended for use in the timing model.
Firm-Level Control Variables
Size: This variable measures firm size by market cap, and is predicted to be correlated negatively with timing, and positively with high equity.
Debt: This variable is expected to correlate positively with timing and negatively with high equity.
Market to Book Ratio:
This variable can be seen as a measure of opportunity of expansion of a firm, as seen by investors. Firms with such opportunity may be considered, all else equal, to have more opportunity to exercise caution in regard to foreign investment, and will wait longer to invest in China.
Sales Growth: Similarly to market to book, firms with high sales growth in their current markets have less incentive to establish a presence in China, all else equal, so this variable is expected to be positively correlated to timing.
R&D Intensity:
This variable is formulated as amount of R&D expenditure scaled by total sales. Firms with a high R&D intensity have a high level of intangible assets, and as such will be more cautious about investing in a new market, and in tum investing with high equity.
Thus the variable is expected to have a positive relation with timing and a negative relation with high equity.
Advertising Intensity: This variable is formulated as amount of advertising expenditure scaled by total sales. Firms with high advertising intensity can be said to be highly concerned with market share, and as such can be expected to hurry to new markets. Thus the variable is expected to be negatively correlated with timing.
Employee Intensity: This variable is formulated as employment level scaled by total sales. Even for provinces with high wages relative to the rest of China, wages will still be significantly lower than those in the U.S. So firms with high employee intensity can be expected to be eager to set up shop in China, as their costs could be drastically lowered. The variable is expected to be negatively correlated with timing of investment.
Manufacturing Dummy: This variable is formulated as a one if the given investment for the observation is classified as manufacturing-related, and zero otherwise (or ifunknown).
Finally, both models include a regional dummy variable and the equity model includes a year dummy variable to capture unaccounted for macro-economic effects. See Table 1 for a concise description of variables.
The Models
The final forms of the models will be as follows, for timing: 
IV. Results
The following table reports the results for an OLS regression using 4 models: model (1) with no corruption variable, model (2) It can be seen that the addition of any of the corruption variables improves the correlation coefficient, and all but PRSG are highly significant as predictors, in the expected negative sign (lower corruption correlates with less waiting to invest). The PRSG index, while just outside 10% significance, edges out the others in stability, with no sign changes for significant variables, and all significant variables staying significant. In contrast, the introduction of World Bank's index causes sales growth to switch from positive and significant to negative and significant. we would like it to be (i.e., less corruption encourages high equity investment). Thirdly, the addition of a corruption variable maintains other variables' significance, and enhancing it in some cases. It also raises the pseudo-R 2 score, though both are quite low. Finally, most included variables are of expected sign, with the exception of rural electricity consumption, which is both significant and of the opposite sign as expected.
V. Conclusion
The timing of investment models run in this experiment had mixed results. Adding corruption variables improved correlation coefficients, but saw some instability of other variables, which were often of an unexpected sign. Transparency International's corruption index performed the worst on all counts, while PRSG and World Bank each had greater measures of success maintaining variable significance and sign stability. In the cases of World Bank and Transparency International, the corruption variable attained high statistical significance, with p-scores at or below 0.01. In the case ofPRSG, results were outside conventional standards of significance, but approached 0.1 0.
Results were much different in the case of the equity type model. While both PRSG and World Bank's indices were dropped due to multicollinearity, Transparency International's index not only found high significance in the expected sign, but kept the model stable and slightly improved significance overall for the control variables. Further, almost all variables were of their expected signs. The only tarnish on this experiment was a rather low pseudo-R 2 of less than 0.30. Overall I would call the experiment a success and would claim that there is evidence that lower perceptions of corruption have a positive relationship with a firm's likelihood of committing FDI as a wholly-owned subsidiary, a joint venture, a new plant, or an acquisition, rather than a mere sales office.
The usefulness of our corruption indices as they are now cannot be taken for granted.
Certainly the fact that they are so poorly correlated to each other should cast doubt on their usefulness in the first place. However, due to the marginally positive results for the timing of entry model, and the generally even better results for the equity model, I remain hopeful about the prospect of continuing to use the indices for useful empirical results.
